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History
Compiled by Rear Admiral Sotirios Georgiadis H.N. (Ret)
CONTRIBUTION AND SACRIFICE OF THE HELLENIC NAVY AND THE GREEK MERCHANT MARINE IN THE ALLIED EFFORT AGAINST THE AXIS DURING W.W. II, 1939-45
Introduction
Both the Greek Merchant
Marine (GMM) as well as the Hellenic Navy (HN), played together very important
roles on the side of the Allies during WW II. The purpose of this short account is to summarize their
substantial contribution to the allied war effort and associated heavy
sacrifice in men and ships and present some lesser known facts.
In peacetime the roles of
the GMM and HN are separate and different, but in wartime the two of them
combine and operate together in as much as the needs of sea replenishment and
transport are concerned. Additionally, GMM seamen are the most valued source of
manpower for HN ships, due to their marine qualifications.
Although Greece remained neutral until attacked by Italy
on the 28th
October 1940, the Greek Government called upon the GMM to
immediately commence serving the Allies from the first day of WW II, on the 1st September 1939. Early the following year 1940, the Greek Prime Minister sent the Greek Minister of Merchant
Marine to London,
to formalize the availability of GMM ships to the Allies. On the very first
day of WW II, when Germany
attacked Poland,
the GMM cargo ship IOANNIS CARRAS became the first Greek casualty. She was
bombed in the harbor
of Gdynia, where she had
arrived the previous day. Between 1st September 1939 and 28th October 1940, i.e. before
Greece
was drawn into WW II, about 350 allied and neutral merchant ships were
lost, out of which about 100 or 28% were Greek. GMM continued
to serve faithfully the allied cause to the very end of WW II in August 1945.
The HN was also the victim
of Italian warplane and submarine attacks before Greece
entered WW II and in conjunction with the GMM continued to serve effectively
its country during the victorious five-month Greek defence against invading Italy at first and later on Germany as well. The latter came to
the help of the defeated Italy
on 6th April 1941,
in order to overcome Greece.
When, two months later, the whole of Greece
finally came under German occupation, the King, the Hellenic Government and the
remaining ships of the HN Fleet did not surrender, but sailed to Alexandria and continued the fight on the side of the
Allies until the end of the war in Europe on
10th May 1945. A
substantial portion of the State Budget of the Greek Government in Exile was
funded by the GMM.
Large numbers of GMM men
have also served on HN warships during the whole of the period considered.
Greek shipowners and seamen, of a younger age at that time, volunteered
and manned HN warships. Typical of many such cases is that of Fotis Lykiardopoulos,
of the well known shipping family, born, raised and living in London,
who joined the HN in 1943 in
England as a volunteer,
attended the British
Cadet School
and participated in the Normandy Naval Landings in June 1944 on board the
British Frigate HMS CHELMER. Stavros Niarchos at the age of 35 and Nicolas
Michalos served on the Corvette RHS KRIEZIS, under Commander D. Kiosses RHN,
together with about 100 other GMM men. Michael Maris served on the Corvette RHS
TOMBAZIS, under Commander G. Panagiotopoulos RHN. Stavros Niarchos was later on
transferred and served on the Destroyer RHS SALAMIS.
Together with two
HN Corvettes, RHS KRIEZIS and RHS TOMBAZIS, the following four GMM cargo
ships participated in the allied Normandy operations:2 C/S "AGIOS SPYRIDON", captained by George Samothrakis,
C/S "GEORGIOS P.", captained by Dimitrios Parisis, C/S "AMERIKI", captained by
Spyridon Theofilatos and C/S "HELLAS", captained by George Trilivas.
Unfortunately WW II GMM
records found were not consistent and consequently some of the data presented
here is necessarily approximate.
Throughout WW II, the GMM
lost over 2.000 seamen and more than 60% of its ocean going ships, while the HN
lost more than 700 men and about 32% of its fighting ships. The Allies made for the HN
warships lost and even increased their
number during the war, in recognition of the HN substantial contribution. At
the same time 15 newly US built Liberty
class 10.000 grt cargo ships were made available to the GMM, to compensate in
part for its severe loses. Shipping losses did not end with WW II in
1945. They continued beyond that period, due to sea mines laid during
the war.
German Submarines menaced
GMM ships and caused most of their losses mainly in the Atlantic,
but also in other seas. The fact that more than 25% of German Submarine
torpedoes fired during the first year of WW II failed due to technical
problems, came as an advantage to the Allied ships. It is remarkable, that
in the first year of the war, an average of only 6 U-Boats at sea at any time,
sank more than 1.000 allied merchant ships, loaded with over 4 million tons of
valuable materials. German predictions (Ref. 5, Vol. II, page 48) claim their
U-Boats could have sank twice as many ships, in case they did not have such
persistent and serious torpedo failures. According to the assessment of the
then Commodore Karl Doenitz, Senior Officer of German U-Boats, later Admiral
Commander in Chief of the German Navy and finally successor of Hitler (Ref. 5,
Vol. I, page 3), neither the German Government nor the Navy had until the
end of 1938 considered Britain
as a possible enemy. Consequently at WW II outbreak the German Navy
possessed the very limited number of 57 commissioned Submarines, out
of 300 needed at the time, of which only 45 were operational. German
Submarine tonnage was then about 45% that of Great Britain. Neither the
existing German Naval Forces, nor those expected from a vast WW II building
program, were considered by Admiral K. Doenitz to be sufficient to obtain
decisive results against British shipping. The stupendous German Submarine
construction program launched and implemented during WW II, resulted in the
commissioning of about 1.153 new U-Boats, while the number constructed,
but not commissioned, was much higher.
The contribution of Greece in the WW II allied effort, as asserted
by Hitler, was as follows: "The entrance of Italy into the war proved
catastrophic for us. Had the Italians not attacked Greece and had they not needed our
help, the war would have taken a different course. We would have had the time
to capture Leningrad and Moscow, before the Russian cold weather had
set in." Hitler uttered words to this effect on March 30, 1944 to his guest and
trusted friend Leni Riefenstahl, the world famous film director, as she writes
in her autobiography. On
the other hand the Soviet Marshal Zhukov notes in his Memoirs: "If the Russian
people were able to raise their tired bodies in front of Moscow's gates, to
hold and turn back the German torrent, they owe it to the Greek people, who
delayed the German Divisions for as long as it would have taken to drive us to
our knees."
The contribution of the
Greek Merchant Marine
At the outbreak of WW II
the GMM held about 2,6% of the world capacity in gross tons (grt), with about
600 ocean going steam ships and about 700 small diesel engined sailing cargo
vessels. Some 90% of the GMM steamship capacity consisted of cargo ships.
However, Greek tonnage was then larger then that of Sweden, the USSR,
Canada, Denmark or Spain.
The British in particular,
in spite of the United Kingdom's top merchant shipping position, with a
capacity of 26,11%, could be supplied and fed only by sea and therefore
required all the tonnage they could get, to cover not only home requirements,
but also their world wide increased war needs as well. GMM shipping came
immediately from the outbreak of WW II to support these requirements, with the
implementation of a relevant Greek Government policy and the co-operation of
shipowners and crews. It is noted that by mid-1940, the British Royal Navy
had only a two-month reserve of fuel. Little more than a year later, in
September 1941, a
quarter of the entire British merchant fleet lay on the bottom of the sea. An
agonized Sir Dudley Pound, the British First Sea Lord, put it starkly by
saying: "If we loose the war at sea, we loose the war"8
Most GMM cargo ships were
coal-burning and very slow, while crew living conditions onboard were very
austere and in fact gruelling.
Navigational aids were minimal. With many Light Houses shut down during WW II,
navigation was hazardous and very much dependent on a simple compass and the
sights of the stars by night and coasts by day.
GMM crews, manning those
slow cargo ships, were easy targets for enemy Submarines and Surface warships.
International Law and War Rules were scarcely observed, at the expense of the
lives of GMM crews. These stipulated that a neutral merchant ship had at first
to be stopped, its cargo searched and only if found carrying war materials
could legitimately be sunk, provided her crew was disembarked beforehand and
taken to safety. In real life, however, and in most instances, enemy Submarines
operating particularly in the Atlantic, used
to sink cargo ships on sight. These were the prevailing harsh conditions, which
accounted for the very large numbers of GMM crew losses. It is noted that
German orders issued to their Submarines on 30th September 1939 (Ref. 5, Vol. I, page 44),
stressed amongst other things that: ".... Since the Greeks have sold and
chartered numerous ships to England,
Greek ships are to be regarded as hostile ..... U-Boats must remain unobserved
while attacking ...."
There were even cases
where enemy ships brutally killed surviving crews, to remove all traces.
Victims of such wanton murders were crewmembers of the GMM cargo ship PELEUS,
to mention just one case, who survived and boarded their life boats, after
their ship was torpedoed and sank by U-852 in the Atlantic at the Equator, near West Africa. U-852 machine-gunned and killed the
survivors. Only her Second Officer Antonis Liosis and two others of her crew
escaped, to tell the tale. At the Nuremberg Trial after WW II the U-852
Commander E. H. Wilhelm was found guilty, sentenced to death and executed.
Out of a total of about
500 GMM ocean going steam cargo ships, approximately 211 were lost as a result
of WW II direct actions. Additionally 107 more cargo ships were lost due to
other causes. Furthermore, out of 55 passenger ships, 52 were lost. Finally, out of over 700 diesel engined small
sailing cargo vessels, of more than 30 grt each, about 500 were also lost. The largest GMM steam cargo ship annual
losses occurred in the Atlantic in the year 1941.
Until that time cargo ships were crossing the Atlantic
singly and unprotected or under weak convoy coverage. Enhanced warship escort and
cargo ship convoy protection applied for the remainder of WW II, reduced annual
losses appreciably.
The above GMM losses
should be compared with the overall allied shipping losses for the whole
duration of WW II, as recorded by the British and disclosed after the war (Ref.
5, Vol. III, page 101), according to which about 2.600 merchant ships
were sunk, about 95% of which, in the Atlantic. GMM losses, therefore,
amount to about 14% of worldwide allied losses, in numbers of cargo and
passenger ships.
Weapons against shipping
included primarily torpedoes, but also mines and bombs. Sea mines were widely
used in all parts of the world and especially in straights and port approaches,
playing havoc to all shipping. It is estimated that a total of over 700.000
mines were laid throughout WW II. About 70% of them were laid by England and Germany. These mines caused grave
losses to shipping not only during WW II, but also long after its end.
During the Italian attempt
to invade Greece, launched from inside Albanian territory then occupied by
Italy, GMM ships under HN protection, transported successfully about 80%
of Hellenic Army materials and personnel from various ports throughout the
country to the main ports near the fighting Front, with the loss of only two
small GMM cargo ships bombed while at anchor at their destinations. About 140
cargo and 47 passenger ships, with the help of 56 tugs, carried out these
tasks.
It is not possible to
refer here to individual cases of ship dramas, sufferings and accomplishments
during WW II, but at least two deeds stand out and deserve particular mention.
The first concerns the ship NICHOLAOS G. KULUKUNDIS, captained by Constantine
Panorios, which in spite of difficulties and in the face of immense dangers
entered the port of Tripoli in Libya
and, on 2nd
February, 1943 brought much needed fuel to the British 8th
Army fighting in North Africa. Winston
Churchill greeted and marked the daring feat, by visiting the ship in person on
4th February 1943.
The second similar achievement was accomplished by the cargoship ELPIS,
captained by Nicolaos Kouvalias, which under heavy bombardment approached Libya
and unloaded valuable fuel for the British Army there, drawing the praise of
the King of England.
The contribution of the
Hellenic Navy
The coming outbreak of
war, the decision to prepare the country's defence, and if Greece were
forced to abandon her neutrality, to enter the war on the side of the
Allies in the ensuing conflict, were announced to the Board of Admirals in
a secret session as early as Autumn 1936 by the then Prime Minister John Metaxas (Ref. 6).
All preparations were
carried out on time between 1937-40, within the limitations of the meager Greek funds and
to a large extent by Greek hands. The HN ordered two Destroyers in England,
their guns in Germany, and simultaneously placed orders for material packages
for two sister ships to be built in Greece, at the newly established HN
Shipyard at Skaramanga, which was intended to cover GMM needs as well. The
1939 edition of "Jane's Fighting Ships" states that the HN had a newbuilding
program consisting of 12 Destroyers and 2 Submarines.
It may be of interest to
note that only Germany at the time was accepting barter payment (clearing) for
military orders, while France, England, and the US required payment in foreign
exchange only, which was very hard for Greece to come by. Furthermore, Germany, in an effort to entice Greece, was absorbing most of the Greece's
agricultural produce.
As an extension of the
"Metaxas Line" of 20 large permanent border fortifications, the HN
constructed and manned 8 shore gun batteries, covering strategic sea
passages and permitting the safe transportation of war materials by ships to
the fighting Front in the north of the country. The HN was also made
responsible for the operation of about 400 sea and air lookouts throughout the
country, as well as for the air defence of Athens
and most of Greece,
save the Front.
The 34 HN fighting
ships that took part in the battle of Greece from 28th October 1940 to 31st May 1941,
were in general old and no match for the 45 times larger and newer Italian
Fleet. However, all HN missions were accomplished successfully and without
losses during the first five-month defence against Italy. ΗΝ losses
started with the German invasion. The Greek Fleet lost 28 fighting ships and
over 700 men throughout WW II. As soon as Greece
came under German occupation, the HN Fleet sailed to Alexandria
in Egypt and operated on the
side of the Allies till the end of WW II in Europe.
In this respect Greece
was the only member of the Allies, whose Fleet did not surrender, but continued
in its entirety to fight the Axis, while the country itself was
under enemy occupation.
Due to the replacement by
the Allies during WW II of ships sunk, the HN Fleet by the end of 1944 numbered
43 fighting ships, overbalancing its losses. At the same time the HN
manpower had risen from about 6.500 in 1940 in Greece, to about 8.500 in 1944
abroad.
The main missions
of the HN Fleet during the battle of Greece and the remainder of WW II, while
by then operating from its main Base abroad in Alexandria, Egypt, were the safe
escort of merchant ship convoys, which were transporting men and materials for
the war effort. It is indicative of the substantial contribution of the HN
Fleet that in 1943, out of 41 warships used then by the Allies as convoy
escorts, 27 were British, 11 Greek and 3 French. (Ref. 6)
In accomplishing allied
war missions between 1941-44, the HN warships covered in sum total about 2
million nautical miles, i.e. they were about 185.000 hours under way. On an
average, each HN warship covered about 20.000 nautical miles under war
conditions.
Epilogue
Greece, the GMM and the HN all played their roles in
WW II and made their contributions on the side of the Allies to the very best
of their abilities, paying dearly in sweat blood and material losses.
The only Greek Shipyard,
capable of building ships, founded between 1937-39, was bombed and destroyed by
the Allies during the spring of the last year of the German occupation of
Greece (1944) and thus was rendered useless and incapable of contributing in
the construction Naval and/or Marine ships after the end of the war.
The GMM licked its war
wounds and made a new start after the end of WW II, to conquer a leading
position in this worldwide, most competitive and harsh market. The US
Government, having built during the war about 2.742 Liberty class cargo ships,
which became surplus at the end of WW II, sold in total about 100 of them to
Greek Shipowners, with guarantees provided by the Greek Government. These ships
constituted the backbone of the GMM, at the start of its post war era. These
100 Liberty
ships, included those 15 made available to the GMM during WW II. Soon after
that, in 1948, the US
sold to Greek shipowners 7 T2 class Oil Tankers, which formed the nucleus of
the famous Greek owned Tanker Fleets developed in the following years. Greek
owned merchant shipping became in 1989 world leader and remains so ever since,
holding in the year 2000 more than 17% of the total internationally available
capacity, with over 3.500 ocean going ships, of more than 90 million gross tons
in total.
The rehabilitation of some
large war devastated German Shipyards, soon after WW II, was helped by Greek
Shipowners' orders. Greek
shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis, followed by Stravros Niarchos, Lyras
Brothers, Diamantis Pateras and others, placed merchant ship newbuilding orders
from 1948 onwards with the ruined Shipyards in northern Germany (Kiel,
Hamburg and Bremen), helping substantially with their re-operation.
Much later, in 1955,
Stavros Niarchos bought the remains from the 1944 Allied bombing of the 1937
established HN Shipyard at Skaramanga and turned it into the very successful
"Hellenic Shipyards SA", which is building and repairing successfully Merchant
as well as Naval ships. The Shipyard became State owned
in 1985 and was privatized again in 2002.
Greece was not as fortunate as all other west European
allied countries liberated in 1944 from German occupation that immediately made
their way forward. Greece,
sharing very extended borders with Albania,
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which at the end of WW II were fully
controlled by the totalitarian USSR,
suffered further severe bloodshed and destruction till 1949, in resisting
repeated armed efforts to be drawn forcefully behind the Iron Curtain. The US President's "Truman Doctrine" in March 1947,
concerning military and financial grant aid to Greece
and Turkey and the US' "Marshal Plan" soon after, handing out
financial aid for the rehabilitation of European Nations, helped Greece
remain in the free and democratic world and start its reconstruction and
upgrade from 1950 onward. When NATO was established in 1949, Greece, which had helped the Allies
substantially in winning WW II, was not immediately accepted as a member. Greece had to wait for Turkey to become ready, so that both Greece and Turkey could join NATO together.
It is reminded that Turkey
in WW I was on the side of the Central Powers and not the Allies. In WW II
Turkey remained "neutrally pro German", supplying Germany with much needed raw
materials and was of course totally unharmed by the war. On the
contrary, Greece
in both World Wars was on the side of the Allies and in particular between
1940-49 suffered the largest losses among the Allies in relation to its size
and population. Nevertheless, the Allies placed Greece and Turkey on the same footing
immediately after WW II. The "balanced" treatment of Greece and Turkey with respect to the "Truman
Doctrine", the "Marshall Plan" and their simultaneous NATO admittance, were
some, but very marked examples of the allied mentality and policy of the time.
REFERENCES
1.
VICE ADMIRAL E. P. KAVADIAS H.N.(Ret), CHIEF OF THE HELLENIC NAVY FLEET
1939-42 AND DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTER 1942-43 "THE NAVAL WAR OF 1940 AS I HAVE
LIVED IT - MEMORIES BETWEEN 2-3-35
AND 25-3-45",
1950
2.
COAST GUARD VICE ADMIRAL CHRIS. DOUNIS (Ret) ARTICLE IN HN NAVAL REVIEW,
"THE GREAT SILENT: THE GREEK MERCHANT MARINE IN WW II", SEPT-OCT 1996
3.
SPYROS ARMENIAKOS ARTICLE IN HN NAVAL REVIEW, "THE GREEK MERCHANT MARINE
CONTRIBUTION IN THE BATTLES OF THE ATLANTIC AND THE MEDITERRANEAN",
SEPT-OCT 1999
4.
ALBUM ON THE SACRIFICES OF GREECE IN THE SECOND WORD WAR, BY
THE HELLENIC MINISTRY OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1946
5.
UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (NAVY),
"GERMAN NAVAL HISTORY - THE U-BOAT WAR IN THE ATLANTIC 1939-45"
6.
VICE ADMIRAL D. FOKAS HN "REPORT ON THE ACTION OF THE HN 1940-44", 1953
7.
ROGER JORDAN, "THE PARTICULARS AND WARTIME FATES OF 6.000 SHIPS - THE
WORLD'S MERCHANT FLEETS 1939" EDITION 1999
8.
US NAVAL INSTITUTE MAGAZINE "NAVAL HISTORY", ARTICLE BY JEROME O'CONNOR,
JUNE 2000
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