History

Zissis Fotakis
Dr. of Naval History of Oxford University

THE NAVAL IMPORTANCE OF GREEK GEOGRAPHIC SPACE AND FLEET FOR THE SAFETY AND THE CONTINUITY OF HELLENISM, 1000 B.C.- 1922 A .D.

Given the long-lasting naval history of Hellenism a big crowd showed interest in joining the Hellenic Navy. Below is described the brevity of the geopolitical realities that Hellenism faced from the antiquity up to in 1922 but also how they reacted and this with the hope that will become comprehensible the naval importance of Greek geographic space and fleet but also their contribution in the safety and the continuity of Hellenism. It will also be covered the period between the Greek Revolution 1821 and the Asia Minor of destruction and perhaps never previously the Hellenism did find itself facing as many and big challenges.

The relation of Hellenism with the sea is very strong with its presence in the southern ending of Peninsula of Aimou. This is because the place and the morphology of Greek space they present singularity to a large extent and that explains the important role that played and continues to play the sea in the history of Greeks. The clean skies of Mediterranean, its powerful currents and the mediocre relatively winds are offered for the growth of shipping even primitive sail or rower boats as those of antiquity but also medieval years. At the same time the multifarious of the Greek beaches, the big number of natural ports and the Polynesia of Greek space to the direction of Asia, Western Europe and Africa elected from early the Greek geographic space as a node of marine communications. The barren end and mountainous of Greek territory but also breaking into pieces in small valleys with difficulty accessing it from land but with forehead in the sea encouraged immigratory tendencies of Greeks and contributed in the appointment of Greece in international shipping centre[1].

The geographic these characteristically contributed also in the safety and the continuity of Hellenism. And this because contrary to the Iberian and Italian peninsula that is separated effectively from remainder Europe via the Pyrinaion and the Alps, the Balkan peninsula is easily accessible from land via Danube. This make in combination with the strategic place between three continents encouraged and it facilitated crowd of raids in Balkan and resulted with the majority of the ancient populations were succumbed and they were ruined [2] .Attacking Greece was a very difficult task due to intense geographic but also the barren territory of Greece unless the intruders were using naval forces. With the frequent however growth by the Greeks of effective naval force, that is to say force that aimed in the adaptation of Greek naval forces in the particularities of each confrontations and theatres of enterprises and no in their thoughtless and immoderate strengthening, was achieved the averting of many dangers and was achieved the survival and prosperity of nation.

It deserves therefore to examine leading, moments of growth of effective naval force from the Greeks. First came the naval strategy of Themistoklis that clear-sightedly stopped the Persian effort for revenge for their defeat in Marathonas (490 B.C.). He prepared the essential fleet that interrupted the marine roots of Persian and their sources of supply in Asia and preventing thus the Persian conquest of Greece[3]. And was not only the strategic thought of Themistoklis that it should be pointed out, it is also the achieved regular exploitation of Greek fleet in the ideal space of narrow Salamis. It is even the satisfactory output of officers and seaman that noteworthy they were all free citizens, well prepared for the defence of their particular homeland, Athens, but also all the Hellenism. It must be noted that when the Athenian were giving the naval battle in Salamis (480 B.C.) Athens had already been captured by Persians and however the Athenian fleet continued the fight as their descendants in the Middle East at the Second World War[4].

Continuing the leading moments of effective Greek naval force we have report the policy of safety of Pericles. This was the continuation of the Themistoklia and further growth of Athenian fleet but also the completion of long walls that rendered Athens unreachable from land[5].Taking advantage of the strategic particularity of their place the Athenians, at least for as long they were under the leadership of Pericles and followers of his policy, they avoided on the land confrontations with enemies numerical and more powerful. On the contrary, they harassed the trade of opponent and with amphibious operations they immediately threatened the cohesion of Peloponnesian alliance and the territorial integrity of Sparta [6].The Athenians during the season of Pericles obeyed the same roughly strategy with which England rendered sovereign the seas for one big and important interval of world history[7].

The Hellenistic years do not have to demonstrate some climax of naval thought. Despite this fact the importance of naval force continues to be appreciated and attributing. The sailing of Nearch at the duration of expedition of Alexander the Great in Asia and the priority that Alexander attributed in the destruction of naval bases of enemy they are indicative how much they appreciated the reality of naval force the Greeks of that season [8]. At the same time the important contribution of fleets of Marseille and Greek cities of Italy in the predominance Roman against the Punic renders explicit the particular weight of Greek naval force since it became helper in the foundation of more brilliant perhaps empire in the world, the Roman Empire [8].

The Roman Empire led the Greek space to decline and the Greek shipping to fall. The reasons are many and the most important is related with the manufacture of Egnatia road but also other empire roads in the near and Middle East that mainly passed Greece and rendered progressively in economic and geopolitical insignificance[9].

The Roman Empire led the Greek space to decline and the Greek shipping to fall. The reasons are many and the most important is related with the manufacture of Egnatia road but also other empire roads in the near and Middle East that mainly passed Greece and rendered progressively in economic and geopolitical insignificance[10].What happened between the discovery of America (1492), and the English extension to India (1763) therefore also the discovery of new continents and the bypass of threatening Ottoman East in the communication of Europe with India and the Far East had negative impact in the place and the naval importance of geographic space of Greece and its naval world[11].

This unfavourable economic situation lasted until the later antiquity but the transport of capital of Roman state from Rome in Istanbul and the progressive shift of centre of weight of Eastern Roman Empire in the space of Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, emanation of progressive loss of empire grounds in new intruders,[12] restored in the limelight the importance but also the topicality of growth of effective naval force from the Byzantines. The first steps to this direction became with the foundation and growth of naval stations and naval bases of operations in strategic points of extensive beaches of empire in the beginning of eighth century. Followed the constitution of well-trained martial fleet, the invention and adoption of new arms of naval war as the "Greek fire" and the application of strict shipping legislation that compelled the Syrians and Egyptians to tranship their merchandises in Istanbul before their deportation for their European ports of destination [13]. Making use of this legislation that constituted precursor of corresponding statutes that England adopted at the 17th century but also developing its explicit supremacy in raw material of great naval importance as iron and the timber the Byzantine Empire knew one beautiful acme for roughly two centuries. The strategically however deliberate shipping policy of Byzantium did not have the stability of the later English with result naval profession progressively of decreasing itself, the trade of empire devolves to the hands of Italian cities and the consecutive turn of Byzantines to the rural economy it is accompanied with concentration of ground in the hands few, social agitation and veiled civilian war between forces of state and the Byzantine landowners. These developments as it is natural attenuated considerably the empire [14]. The appearance end and growth of heavy artillery at the end of medieval years declined the almighty fortifications of Istanbul (1453)[15] .The Hellenism was thus submitted in the sovereignty of Turks, which the end came in March 1821.

The morning of 25 March began the fight of independence of modern Hellenism, which proved to be a difficult battle. In the four hundred roughly years of Ottoman domination a lot of revolutionary movements took place in the Greek world enough from them had also limited support from Christian forces of Europe. Despite however this supports but also the bravery that they demonstrated enough from the slave Greeks the results were not good [16]. In the 1821 international conditions were not very encouraging were for the Greek claims. The Holily Alliance, the Directorial of the Forces status quo in which participated, England, France, Austria, the Prussia and Russia, opposed vigorously in each revolutionary movement. The Greek therefore Revolution, in its start had to face the animosity of Europe and the determination of Turks to oppose each revolutionary movement. Despite all the disputes and civilian that emerged between the revolutionary Greeks the revolution bore, it kept six entire years and in the end it forced Alias Forces to intervene in order to they stop this long bloodshed.

This was not a small achievement. On the contrary, from 1800 and afterwards many revolutionary movements took place in Europe but no one however lasted and it did not bother so much the Alias Forces as long as the Greek Revolution 1821 [17].This big Greek success is owed in important degree in the bravery and the self-sacrifice of Greek rebels. But even if the bravery was not absent from the Greeks this was not enough to achieve their release in older fights at the duration of Ottoman domination. What the Greeks achieved at the Revolution of 1821 they achieved it because they allocated for first time in the 'Modern Years' a numerous commercial fleet, which was changed to warlike for the needs of Revolution. As mentioned earlier, the communication via sea was the only effective source of supply for intruders in southern Greece at the pre-industrial years, the Greek navy offered services in the fight with it harasses systematically and it interrupted effectively the Turkish communications. As proved the weakness of Greek navy to ward off the bridgehead that installed the Ibraem in Peloponnese in the beginning of 1825 without the action of Greek navy revolutionary Greece from early would have been submerged by Turkish-Egyptian troops and the revolution would have found rather the fate of Greek
revolutionary movements that preceded this [18].

The end of revolution did not bring the achievement of national objectives. Peloponnese, the Sterea Hellas (middle part of Greece) and the Cyclades they were released however the two third of Hellenism remained under Ottoman sovereignty. The newly established Greek state was interested from early for the chance of these populations. The first fifty years however afterwards the release the Greek liberation struggle policy will meet big reaction from the thalassocrat England that supported the maintenance of territorial integrity of Turkey. This was because the English considered that the Ottoman Empire would contribute in the prevention of Russia's spreading in the Mediterranean. If that happened it would threaten to interrupt the line of communications of England with its empire in India [19] .Adapting its policy in the unfavourable international economic situation the Greek state did not develop powerful navy [20]. The unfavourable however this international frame was reversed with the Russian-Turkish War 1878 and the emancipation of also other than Greece of Balkan states. Keeping in mind the existence and well-trained the troops of newly established Balkan countries and the weak strategically new borders of Turkey in Balkans[21] the government Trikoupi adopted a simple as much as well-aimed drawing that inspired the Greek strategy before the beginning of Balkan Wars. This strategic plan in general lines forecasted the growth of capable martial fleet that would interrupt the Turkish marine communications while simultaneously would cover but also would accelerate the completion of Greek mobilisation. With the achievement of these two objectives the government Trikoupi expected that in potential Greek-Turkish war the Greek army would move in the Continent and Macedonia and that she could resist effectively in the Turkish counter-attacks for relatively big time interval. If this happened the probability of Serb-Bulgarian intervention would be rendered most likely and the prospect of defeat of Turkey of course[22].

The development of Italian-Turkish War in 1911, as well as, the First Balkan War 1912-1913 they confirmed the correctness of strategic plan of government Trikoupi. They showed also with the most explicit way the importance of interruption of marine communications of Turks from the Italian and then Greek fleet for the good result of martial enterprises for the Greek arms[23]. With all success however the Greek navy at the Balkan Wars, all diplomatic sharpness they demonstrated the governor of country Eleftherios Venizelos the territorial profits of war possibly were not allocated in Greece if England and Germany did not wish the use of geographic space of Greece for the guarantee of sovereignty in central and Eastern Mediterranean. In a season that the naval competition between England and Germany had climaxed, in a period where the sovereignty of Mediterranean from the Anglo-French fleet was threatened by the allies in Germany fleets of Italy and Austria the use of Greek ports in time of war, particularly these Ionian islands, it was legitimately desirable and from the two coalitions[24].As result the majority of alias forces observed positive attitude against the most Greek claims and thus Greece 1821 was doubled in the 1913 and an important step to the materialisation of 'Megali Idea' (Great Idea) was achieved [25]. The objective of release of mass of the Greeks became reality with the important services that offered in the allies the use of Greek ports at the First World War but also the generally accepted most excellent record of Greek fleet in the escort cavalcade [26] was also decided the output in Greece of Thrace and Ionian. Due to political reasons and also the imbalance of forces cancelled this national success [27] of the Greek navy with biggest disaster the one known as Asia Minor [28].

All the above achievements rendered the big naval importance of geographic space of Greece but also the contribution of its navy in the safety and the continuity of Hellenism. As remains therefore this ascertainment as introductive sparks for the delight of Greek naval history from the antiquity up to today.

Zissis Fotakis
Dr. of Naval History of Oxford University
Writer of publication "Greek Naval Strategy and the Great Powers 1910-1919"
(Frank Cass 2004)

[1] Stavrianos, L.S., The Balkans since 1453 (London, 2001), page 15-16

[2] O.P. page 1-3

[3] Simpsas M., The Navy in the History of Greeks, Tom. 1, page 187-188

[4] O.P. page 191-200

[5] Kagan, D., "Athenian Strategy in the Pelloponesean War", in the Williamson, M., McGregor, K., And Bernstein, A., (eds.). The making of Modern Strategy: Rulers, States and the Conduct of War (New York, 1995), page 54

[6] Simpsas M., Vol. 1, page 217-232

[7] The English naval strategy in the diachrony is described at better way in the Kennedy, P. M., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976)

[8] Simpsas M., Vol. 1, page 295-314

[9] Bernstein, A., "The Strategy of a warrior-state: Rome and the Wars against Carthage, 264-201B.C.", in the Williamson, M., McGregor, K., And Bernstein, A., (eds.). The making of Modern Strategy: Rulers, States and the Conduct of War (New York, 1995), page 71, 80

[10] Stavrianos, The Balkans, page 20-21

[11] Kennedy, P.M., The Rise and Fall, page 11

[12] Material with regard to the barbaric raids and the consequences in the Byzantium finds no one in Editorial Athens, History of Greek Nation (Tom 6 and 7, Athens, 1977-1979)

[13] Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall", page 37-67. Preston, R. A., Wise, P. F. And Werner, H. O., Men in Arms: the history of warfare and its interrelationships with western society (London, 1962) page 54, 59

[14] O. P.

[15] Howard, M., War in European History (Oxford, 1977), page 14

[16] For the pre-revolutionary movements see Editorial Athens, Vol. 10, page 311-12, 322-33, 402-16 and Vol. 11, page 64-97

[17] A full presentation of history of Greek Revolution 1821 is found in Editorial Athens, Vol. 12. Also see Anderson, M.S., The Eastern Question, 1774-1923, (New York, 1966), page 53-76

[18] Simpsas M., Vol. 3, page 203-262, and Vol.4, page 1-101

[19] Reed, C. V., The British Naval Missions at Constantinople, 1908-1914 (D.Phil. Oxford, 1995), page 4-7; Driault, E., Lheritier, M., Histoire diplomatique dela Grece de 1821 a nos jours (Vol. 2, Paris, 1926), pp. 309-316,328-60, 388-417; Editorial Athens, Vol. 13, pp. 137-141, 165, 217; P. R. O., ADM. 116/3098, Admiralty War Staff Memorandum, 28 Oct. 1912

[20] Most complete chorography that are reported in the stagnation of Greek navy this period is the Fokas, D. , Temporally the Greek Navy, 1833-1873 (Athens, 1923)

[21] Yasamee, F. A. K., "Abdulhamid II and the Ottoman Defence Problem", Diplomacy and Statecraft (Vol. 4, No.1 1993), page 23

[22] Gennadios, File Dragoumi, File 7/1, Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Greece, London, June 1886, Telegram No. 21, Rumbold to Salisbury, Athens, 9 Jan. 1886; P. R., F. 32/599, Haggard to Rosebery, Athens, 18 Feb. 1888; P. R., F. 32/607, Monson to Salisbury, Athens, 6 June 1889. Levidis N., History of Greek-Turkish War (Athens, 1899, page 42, 67, 72). Argyropoulos, P. The Naval Program of Greece, (Athens 1907) page 181-90. Pournaras D. Charilaos Trikoupis: the life and the work of (Tom. 2, Athena, c. 1976), page 141-42, 158-61. Expectation of elongation of War v l. Gennadios, File Dragoumi, File 152, Brialmont-Memoire sur la defense de la Grece, 25 March 1883 & D. I. S, File 1705, Report under Hatzianesti, Staff of Army Thessaly, 17 Feb. 1897

[23] Rohde, H., Die Ereignissezur see und das Zussamenwirken von Heer und Flotte im Balkankrieg 1912-1913 (Berlin, 1914), page 151-152. Demetrakopoulos, A., "The Contribution of the Hellenic Navy the Allied Effort during the First Balkan War (1912-13)", Acta, International Symposium of Military History ' Mudros 92 ' 'Pavlos Melas 92 ' (Athens, 1993), page 58-59

[24] Fotakis, Z., Greece, its Navy and the Foreign Factor, Nov. 1910-March 1919 (D. Phil. Oxford, 2003), page 100-122

[25] Indicatively we report the following work: Lagoe, R., Greece and the Great Powers: the Question of the Aegean Islands, 1912-1914 (Ph.D. Ohio University, 1976). Kaldis, W. P., "Background for Conflict: Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Islands, 1912-1914", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 51, No. 2.1978), page D1119-D1146. Gardikas-Katsiadakis, Greece and the Balkan Imbroglio (Athens, 1996), pp. 152-157, 166-67, 214-18, 247-268. Helmreich E. K., The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars (Cambridge MA, 1938), pp. 331-340, 418-442. Loulos, Mr, The German Policy in Greece, 1897-1914 (Athens 1990), pages 147-153, 168-171, 184-199, 213-27; Crampton, R. J., The Hollow Detente. Anglo-German Relations in the Balkans 1911-1914 (London 1980), page 75-166

[26] Fotakis, Z., Greece, its Navy, page 270. Mediterranean Staff Papers relating to Naval Operations from August 1917 to December 1918 (1923), page 21 in Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1914-1918 (London 1987), page 369

[27] Asia Minor ("Mikra Asia") destruction and the reasons that led in this being the subject of many work. Indicatively we report the following: Smith, M. L., Ionian Vision. Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922 (London, 1973). General Staff of Army, Abridged History of Expedition of Small Asia, 1919-1922 (Athens 1972), Karvounarakis, Th., Anglo - Greek Relations 1919-1922, (Ph. D. Cambridge, 1992), Editorial Athens, Vol. 15, pages 103-199, 260-270

[28] Petropoulos, N., Recollections of Old Navy, 1923-1940 (Athens 1962), page 34-36